Studying social phenomena is often assumed to be inherently different from studying natural science phenomena. In psychology, this assumption has led to a division of the field into social and experimental domains. The same kind of division has carried over into ecological psychology, despite the fact that Gibson clearly intended his theory for both social and natural phenomena. In this paper, we argue that the social/natural science dichotomy can be derived from a distinction between hermeneutics and science that is deeply (...) rooted in the atomistic, structuralist ontological tradition. We show that, from a process-based perspective, the central questions of hermeneutics (action of an individual within a context of possible actions), ecological psychology (behavior of an organism in an ecological niche) and physics (motion of a particle in a field) share a similar structure. Building on these ideas, we propose a common, process-based methodology for psychology that integrates field theory with insights from quantum mechanics to accommodate traditionally problematic concepts in natural science such as teleology and values. To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, empirical findings on the paradigmatic problem of prospective control (such as gaze control in automobile driving in relation to perceptual tuning) are presented. (shrink)

Latash & Anson's intention to describe only the regularities of motor behavior is compromised by the homunculus paradigm. Although we concur on the need to redefine in atypical populations, we contend that this enterprise requires a process based functionalism. We argue for accommodating movement control and perceptual processes with physical and task constraints in a natural setting.

A propagator for a path space integral can be used to represent the and provides a natural way to model a control signal that is temporally segmented by placement of pairs of stimulating and recording electrodes. Although care must be exercised in interpreting the resulting measurement, the technique should prove useful to experimenters who study cerebellar functioning.

A path space integral approach to modelling the job description of the cerebellum is proposed. This new approach incorporates the equation into a kind of generalized Huygens's wave equation. The resulting exponential functional integral provides a mathematical expression of the inhibitory function by which the cerebellum the intended control signal from the background of neuronal excitation.

This book highlights some of the most pressing safety, ethical, legal and societal issues related to the diverse contexts in which robotic technologies apply. Focusing on the essential concept of well-being, it addresses topics that are fundamental not only for research, but also for industry and end-users, discussing the challenges in a wide variety of applications, including domestic robots, autonomous manufacturing, personal care robots and drones.

This book highlights some of the most pressing safety, ethical, legal and societal issues related to the diverse contexts in which robotic technologies apply. Focusing on the essential concept of well-being, it addresses topics that are fundamental not only for research, but also for industry and end-users, discussing the challenges in a wide variety of applications, including domestic robots, autonomous manufacturing, personal care robots and drones.

On 18–19 May 2018, a symposium was held in the Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies at the University of Aberdeen to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Ronald W. Hepburn (1927–2008). The speakers at this event discussed Hepburn’s oeuvre from several perspectives. For this book, the collection of the revised versions of their talks has been supplemented by the papers of other scholars who were unable to attend the symposium itself. Thus this volume contains contributions from (...) eighteen notable scholars of different disciplines, ranging from contemporary aesthetics and art theory through to philosophical approaches to religion, education and social anthropology. It also includes a bibliography of Hepburn’s writings. The essays were first published in two special issues of the Journal of Scottish Thought, vols. 10–11 (2018–2019). -/- Ronald William Hepburn was born in Aberdeen on 16 March 1927. He went to Aberdeen Grammar School, then he graduated with an M.A. in Philosophy (1951) and obtained his doctorate from the University of Aberdeen (1955). His tutor at Aberdeen was Donald MacKinnon (1913– 1994), a Scottish philosopher and theologian, the author of A Study in Ethical Theory (1957) and The Problem of Metaphysics (1974). Hepburn taught as Lecturer at the Department of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen (1956–60), and he was also Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University (1959–60). He returned from the United States as Professor of Philosophy at Nottingham University. In 1964, he was appointed as a Chair in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and between 1965 and 1968 he was also Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Cambridge. From 1975 until his retirement in 1996, he held the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. He died in Edinburgh on 23 December 2008. His philosophical interests ranged from theology and the philosophy of religion through moral philosophy and the philosophy of education to art theory and aesthetics. Notably, Hepburn is widely regarded as the founder of modern environmental and everyday aesthetics as a result of the influence of papers in the 1960s which pioneered a new approach to the aesthetics of the natural world. (shrink)

According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...) to which prejudices are epistemically insidious: once they are internalized as background beliefs, they quite reasonably come to control the assessment and interpretation of new evidence. This property of insidiousness helps explain why prejudices are so recalcitrant to empirical counterevidence and also why they are frequently invisible to introspective reflection. (shrink)

Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die Unterscheidung (...) zwischen causa efficiens and causa finalis nicht, wie Murray nahelegt, mit der Unterscheidung zwischen physikalischen und geistigen Ereignissen zusammenfällt. In diesem Zusammenhang mache ich deutlich, dass die prästabilierte Harmonie nicht als Beziehung zwischen unterschiedlichen Arten von Substanzen, Geistern und Körpern, verstanden werden kann. Zuletzt skizziere ich kurz, worin m. E. die eigentliche Auffassung von Leibniz mit Blick auf die behandelte Problematik besteht. (shrink)

Philosophers are often beholden to a picture of language as a largely static, well-defined structure which is handed over from generation to generation by an arduous process of learning: language, on this view, is something that we are given, and that we can make use of, but which we play no significant role in creating ourselves. This picture is often maintained in conjunction with the idea that several distinctively human cognitive capacities could only develop via the language acquisition process, as (...) thus understood. This paper argues that the phenomenon of homesign, i.e., spontaneous gesture systems devised by deaf children for the purpose of communicating with their non-signing peers, can shed valuable empirical light on these convictions. Contrary to grounding assumptions of Wittgensteinian, Gricean, and Peircean approaches to language, homesign shows how core properties of language—including semantic properties—can be built from the ground up in idiosyncratic ways to serve the communicative needs of individuals. (shrink)

Bei der umfassenden Thematik der Relation zwischen Philosophie und Pädagogik liefert die Philosophie von Kant ein ganz besonders reiches und vielschichtiges Beispiel für die Reflexion. Kants Philosophie steht in einer dreifachen Beziehung zur im wahren und ursprünglichen Sinne genommenen Schulphilosophie. Erstens gilt der Gesamtkorpus der Kant’schen Philosophie als bewusste und kritische Überwindung der Leibniz-Wolff’schen Metaphysik . Zweitens gilt die Kant‘sche Philosophie, auch wenn sie in diesem wahren Sinne des Begriffs selber keineswegs als Schulphilosophie aufgefasst werden kann, in ihrer spezifisch ausgearbeiteten (...) Ausführung als Überwindung des Leibniz-Wolff’schen Systems auch als Schulphilosophie. Und drittens kann die Kant’sche Philosophie, auf ihre Art, versteht sich, auch als neue positive schulphilosophische Alternative gelten, für welche sie etwa durch ihre systematische, vollständige Ausführung der Problemkreise, der konsequent zur Geltung gebrachten hermeneutischen und didaktischen Aspekte oder durch die vollständige sprachliche Kohärenz wie prädestiniert ist. Unter diesem Aspekt unterscheidet sich die Relation Kants zum Leibniz-Wolff’schen System von derselben bei Schelling oder eben Hegel. Hegel geht auch regelrecht auf die vielfache historische Bedeutung dieser gewaltigen Schulphilosophie ein, auf einer ähnlichen Linie hebt Schelling sogar hervor, dass selbst noch die Fehler dieser Schule von unvergleichlichem Nutzen für die Philosophie waren, weil es ohne sie zu keiner späteren Blütezeit der Philosophie hätte kommen können. Für Kant bedeutet diese umfassende Schulphilosophie weder die Vergangenheit noch den Gegenpol, aber auch nicht die niedrige Stufe der hohen Philosophie, für ihn bedeutet diese große Schulphilosophie einen denkerischen Rahmen, der einerseits in jeder seiner Einzelheit transformiert werden muss, während die neue hohe Philosophie andererseits den Rahmen der Schulphilosophie bei ihrer Konstitution in Anspruch nehmen muss. Dies ist nur möglich, weil das Bedürfnis nach Philosophie zwar nicht identisch mit dem nach Schulphilosophie ist, es in breiten Flächen aber tatsächlich abdeckt. (shrink)

Nietzsche's vision of modern democracy includes an aspect which many tend to neglect given the historical experience with totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. Precisely on account of its triumphant progress, 'irresistible' democracy, according to Nietzsche, tends to instrumentalize the activities of its enemies. This is a claim made by a philosopher whose work Alfred Baeumler and Georg Lukács considered an extreme political archaism. For a long time no serious objection was raised against this absurd verdict. The present article attempts (...) to show how Nietzsche's universalistic approach assigns a definite place to democratic systems and specifies why these systems are of special relevance for the universal-emancipatory development of humankind It argues that by stating the prophylactic character of the democratic system Nietzsche reaches the very core of his philosophy whereby he differs markedly and positively from other political philosophers. The difference lies precisely in the fact that for Nietzsche a given political system is not an ultimate value or objective, but simply an occasion to realize universal human ambitions. Nietzsche's political philosophy, therefore, establishes a distinction between various political systems evaluating them in terms of their prophylactic potential for the purposes of universal-emancipatory development. /// A visão nietzschiana da democracia moderna inclui um aspecto que muitos intérpretes tendem a esquecer devido à experiência histórica do século XX com sistemas totalitários. Para Nietzsche, é devido ao seu triunfante progresso que a democracia 'irresístivel' tende a instrumentalizar as actividades dos seus próprios inimigos. Curiosamente, esta é a pretensão de um filósofo cuja obra Alfred Baeumler e Georg Lukács consideravam como sendo uma forma extrema de arcaísmo politico, veredicto este contra o qual durante muito tempo nenhuma objecção se levantou. Objectivo dopresente artigo, porém, é precisamente mostrar até que ponto a abordagem universalista de Nietzsche atribui aos sistemas democráticos um lugar determinado e ao mesmo tempo especifica a razão pela qual estes sistemas ocupam um lugar privilegiado no que se refere ao desenvolvimento universal-emancipatório da humanidade. A tese do autor, com efeito, é a de que é precisamente ao afirmar o carácter profíláctico do sistema democrático que Nietzsche alcança o verdadeiro núcleo central da sua filosofia, facto esse mediante o qual ele claramente se distingue de outros pensadores polítcos. A diferença está precisamente no facto de para Nietzsche um determinado sistema político nunca constituir em si um valor último ou objectivo, antes encontra o seu valor na ocasião que porporciona para a realização de ambições humanas universais. A filosofia politica de Nietzsche, portanto, estabelece uma distinção entre uma diversidade de sistemas políticos propondo uma avaliação dos mesmos de acordo com o seu potential profiláctico no que se refere aos objectivos de um desenvolvimento universal e emancipatório. (shrink)

Nietzsche saisit l'une des nouvelles fonctions de l'art d'une manieére divinatoire. Lorsqu'on "facilite" la vie de cette facçon, cela n'est pas me é me apparement identique aux arts de distractions provoqueés par les formes anteérieures des connaissances. Faciliter la vie, ce n'est plus un acte naif ou naturel, mais le reésultat d'une deécision: par la creéation de cette distance, l'art a pu remplir de nouvelles fonctions, tout en sauvegardant ses propres qualiteés speécifiques. Nous pourrions formuler par des termes plus modernes: (...) satisfaire aux nouveaux besoins. L'art facilitant la vie en ce sens-laéapparait sous une forme plus geéneéraliseée en tant qu'un "e|acircum|tre faisant volte-face". Ceux qui connaissent la formulation de Walter Benjamin qui aboutit aécette ideée, pourront reéveéler l'importance de cette geéneéralisation. (shrink)

Bei seiner -- wie vorausgeschickt -- strategischen Bestimmung des ganzheitlichen Standortes der Philosophie in ihrem Entfaltungsprozeß verfährt Hegel in der Differenzschrift zweigleisig. Auf der einen, mehr sichtbaren und auch in der philosophischen Tradition gründlicher und tiefer rezipierten Ebene liefert er die berühmte und bei jeder Bestimmung der Philosophie und des »philosophischen Bedürfnisses« bis heute überhaupt viel zitierte Definition, wonach in dem neuen welthistorischen Weltalter der Entzweiung ein qualitativ neues Bedürfnis nach der Vereinigung der Gegensätze, d.h. nach »Philosophie« artikuliert wird. Weil (...) es nicht zum direkten Gegenstand unseres Versuchs gehört, deuten wir nur in unausgeführter Form an, wie und warum wir einen spezifischen Verdacht gegenüber dieser allseits ohne jegliche Kritik akzeptierten Definition hegen. Dieser Verdacht gründet sich einerseits auf der Tatsache, daß diese Definition ein starkes Zugeständnis an die aufkommenden romantischen Evidenzvorstellungen enthält. Im Anbetracht von Hegels stets artikulierter antiromantischer Einstellung dürfte es direkt auffallen, warum er gerade bei einer so unmittelbaren Kategorisierung des allerneuesten Weltalters eine in ihrer Struktur und in ihren Wertvorstellungen »romantische« Ansicht vertritt. Versucht man ferner den Gehalt dieser Einschätzung interpretativ noch weiter zu rekonstruieren, so läßt sich dieser Gehalt bald geradezu antihegelianisch auslegen. Denn eine »Vereinigung«, deren »Macht« unterging und eine »Einheit«, deren Macht und Geltung deshalb wiederhergestellt werden muß, klingt nicht nur als romantische »Grundbefindlichkeit«, sondern läßt sich auch als eine Auffassung verstehen, die den Grundintentionen der Geschichtsbetrachtung auch des jungen Hegel diametral widerspricht, denn wo ließe sich bei ihm eine mögliche Periode, oder zumindest eine Antizipation der möglichen »Einheit« in seinen Gedanken nachweisen? (shrink)

Bei seiner -- wie vorausgeschickt -- strategischen Bestimmung des ganzheitlichen Standortes der Philosophie in ihrem Entfaltungsprozeß verfährt Hegel in der Differenzschrift zweigleisig. Auf der einen, mehr sichtbaren und auch in der philosophischen Tradition gründlicher und tiefer rezipierten Ebene liefert er die berühmte und bei jeder Bestimmung der Philosophie und des »philosophischen Bedürfnisses« bis heute überhaupt viel zitierte Definition, wonach in dem neuen welthistorischen Weltalter der Entzweiung ein qualitativ neues Bedürfnis nach der Vereinigung der Gegensätze, d.h. nach »Philosophie« artikuliert wird. Weil (...) es nicht zum direkten Gegenstand unseres Versuchs gehört, deuten wir nur in unausgeführter Form an, wie und warum wir einen spezifischen Verdacht gegenüber dieser allseits ohne jegliche Kritik akzeptierten Definition hegen. Dieser Verdacht gründet sich einerseits auf der Tatsache, daß diese Definition ein starkes Zugeständnis an die aufkommenden romantischen Evidenzvorstellungen enthält. Im Anbetracht von Hegels stets artikulierter antiromantischer Einstellung dürfte es direkt auffallen, warum er gerade bei einer so unmittelbaren Kategorisierung des allerneuesten Weltalters eine in ihrer Struktur und in ihren Wertvorstellungen »romantische« Ansicht vertritt. Versucht man ferner den Gehalt dieser Einschätzung interpretativ noch weiter zu rekonstruieren, so läßt sich dieser Gehalt bald geradezu antihegelianisch auslegen. Denn eine »Vereinigung«, deren »Macht« unterging und eine »Einheit«, deren Macht und Geltung deshalb wiederhergestellt werden muß, klingt nicht nur als romantische »Grundbefindlichkeit«, sondern läßt sich auch als eine Auffassung verstehen, die den Grundintentionen der Geschichtsbetrachtung auch des jungen Hegel diametral widerspricht, denn wo ließe sich bei ihm eine mögliche Periode, oder zumindest eine Antizipation der möglichen »Einheit« in seinen Gedanken nachweisen? (shrink)

O artigo examina os trabalhos completos de Cassirer, assim como seus escritos póstumos com relação à tese de Heinz Paetzold de que a filosofia de Cassirer sofre uma transformação em direção à antropologia em seu trabalho tardio, assim como a tese de Guido Kreis de que tal transformação da filosofia dos símbolos não é possível porque não pode garantir seu próprio fundamento. O autor demonstra uma continuidade no pensamento de Cassirer com relação ao tema da antropologia, segundo a qual Cassirer (...) vem lidando com o problema de uma metafísica do simbólico desde pelo menos 1921 e já em 1928 faz uma determinação inicial do homem como um ser capaz de forma. A retomada da questão antropológica ocorre em 1939 e está em clara continuidade com os trabalhos anteriores. A reconstrução da gênese de _Ensaio sobre o homem_ que se segue revela finalmente um segredo até então bem guardado da pesquisa de Cassirer, ou seja, uma resposta à questão de por que a história aparece pela primeira vez como uma forma simbólica na última obra publicada por Cassirer. (shrink)

Is there such a sub-discipline as “sociology of valuation and evaluation”? Identifying the main focus, the topics, and the analytical designs, i.e., reflecting on a theoretical profile of such an investigation, is far from complete. The main question is indeed—where to start when addressing the sociology of valuation and evaluation? Is it a specific area of research, analysis, and inquiry, with specific objects? Should we confine it to the many important qualitative and quantitative studies dedicated to the measure of market (...) performance, the efficiency of public policy, profitability of private investment, or identification of best practices in various areas ? Beyond business and administration processes, a huge body of research in economic sociology has developed in recent years that has renewed the investigations on economic experience through a moral lens (Lamont 2000; Vatin 2008; Karpik 2010; Beckert and Aspe .. (shrink)

Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harms that prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these (...) beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for non-ideal epistemology which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more. (shrink)

The present essay is a compact form of the results obtained during many decades of research into the primeval foundations of the collective fields of force, both social and of consciousness. Since everything is determined by their origins, and the collective forces arise from the mind, we had to explore the ultimate origins of mind. We have come to recognize the law of interactions as the law and necessity which determine the primeval origins of mind. It also determines the substance (...) and essence of the Universe and the modes of its existence and functioning. The present essay is a concise form of results obtained during many decades of research in the primeval foundations of collective, both social and consciousness fields. I point out that a yet unknown type of forces existed in the Golden Age, which I termed as collective force. In the Golden Age mankind lived in communities which had a full unity. The communal life developed its collective forms, of which the most significant are the development of human speech, of language, share of work and the development of the communal fests. The law determining the primeval origins of mind is the cosmic law of interactions. It defines the substance of the Universe and the ways of its existence and activity. A detailed analysis is presented on the nature of the lay of interaction here. One consequence of this fundamental principle is the general prevalence of the principle of mutuality, which plays a basic role in the understanding of the unfolding and degeneration of consciousness. The principle of mutuality determines the changes of every levels of life. The laws of the generation of consciousness in the ages of evolution toward Homo and the Golden Age are analysed. I presented some evidences indicating the factual existence of the Golden Age, as well as its destruction, which was necessarily accompanied by the overthrow of the consciousness of the Golden Age, its repression and replacement by the newly developed rational, upper or superficial mind. Starting from the consideration that our mind is a product of our history, the phenomenon of the 'double mind' is recognised, the largely antagonistic duality of human mind. It is succeeded to solve the riddle of the double mind and determining its substance. Our double mind, consisting of the ‘upper’ or rational mind and the ‘deep-mind’, is a creature of the two fundamental ages of mankind, that of the age of power domination and the Golden Age. Therefore it expresses the duality of our history. We attempted to explore the heritage of the Golden Age embedded into our world of instincts, sexuality, emotional and sensual world, and the expressions of this heritage according to the different periods of our lives. If we will succeed in enlightening the deep-mind it may make it possible to give back the long-forgotten collective fields of forces to mankind, unavailable to the surface mind at present, and would expand the all-pervasive power of the conscious mind significantly. Hopefully, our results open up new vistas for the research of the collective fields and the double nature of the human mind, and may enable us to know and complete ourselves more deeply and thoroughly. (shrink)

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call (...) “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios. (shrink)

Beliefs can cause moral wrongs, no doubt, but can they also constitute moral wrongs in their own right? This paper offers some grounds to be skeptical of the idea that there are moral norms which operate directly on belief, independently of any epistemic norms also operating on belief. The resultant skepticism is moderate in the following sense: it holds that the motivations underlying the doxastic morality approach should not be dismissed lightly; they are genuine insights and serve to bring to (...) light important new issues concerning the interaction between our notions of moral and epistemic responsibility. Nonetheless, it is also skeptical, in holding that these concerns are ultimately best voiced in more traditional categories which distinguish the epistemology of belief from the morality of action. (shrink)

Belief polarization is widely seen to threaten havoc on our shared political lives. It is often assumed that BP is the product of epistemically irrational behaviors at the individual level. After distinguishing between BP as it occurs in intra-group and inter-group settings, this paper argues that neither process necessarily reflects individual epistemic irrationality. It is true that these processes can work in tandem to produce so-called “echo chambers.” But while echo chambers are often problematic from the point of view of (...) collective rationality, it doesn't follow that individuals are doing anything wrong, epistemically speaking, in seeking them out. In non-ideal socio-epistemic contexts, echo chamber construction might provide one's best defense against systematic misinformation and deception. (shrink)

In any domain of inductive reasoning, we must take care to distinguish between (i) which hypothesis my evidence supports, and (ii) the level of confidence I should have in the hypothesis, given my evidence. This distinction can help resolve the problem of peer demotion, a central point of contention in the epistemology of peer disagreement. It is true that disagreement does not provide evidence that I am right and you are wrong. But it need not, in order to lead to (...) peer demotion: instead, significant disagreement can erode my confidence in the initial peer assessment to a point where I can no longer rationally sustain the belief that we are equally reliable. One consequence of this solution is that the line dividing the Equal Weight view from its competitors emerges as an artifact of a mistakenly one-dimensional picture of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of Davidson’s conclusion in ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, focusing on the psychology and epistemology of language. Drawing on empirical studies in language acquisition and sociolinguistics, I problematize the traditional idealizing assumption that a person’s mental lexicon consists of two distinct parts—a dictionary, comprising her knowledge of word meanings proper, and an encyclopedia, comprising her wider knowledge of worldly affairs. I argue that the breakdown of the dictionary–encyclopedia distinction can be given a cognitive and functional (...) explanation: facts regarding language learning and the challenges of coping with linguistically diverse environments require that dictionary and encyclopedia remain deeply integrated rather than categorically distinct dimensions of the mental lexicon. This argument provides support for a psychologized version of Davidson’s conclusion in ‘Derangement’: there is no such thing as a language, in the sense that there is no diachro.. (shrink)

This article surveys the major historical developments in Western philosophical reflection on war. Section 2 outlines early development in Greek and Roman thought, up to and including Augustine. Section 3 details the systematization of Just War theory in Aquinas and his successors, especially Vitoria, Sua´rez, and Grotius. Section 4 examines the emergence of Perpetual Peace theory after Hobbes, focusing in particular on Rousseau and Kant. Finally, Section 5 outlines the central points of contention following the reemergence of Just War theory (...) in the 1970s. (shrink)

The famous debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger of 1929 in Davos was set on a global stage and, yet, inherently Eurocentric. This volume explores how the hypothetical presence of the Kyoto school founder Nishida Kitarō would have overcome this limitation.

Part of a symposium on *The Rationality of Perception* by Susanna Siegel (2017 Oxford University Press).

It has recently been argued that public linguistic norms are implicated in the epistemology of testimony by way of underwriting the reliability of language comprehension. This paper argues that linguistic normativity, as such, makes no explanatory contribution to the epistemology of testimony, but instead emerges naturally out of a collective effort to maintain language as a reliable medium for the dissemination of knowledge. Consequently, the epistemologies of testimony and language comprehension are deeply intertwined from the start, and there is no (...) room for grounding the one in terms of the other. (shrink)

This paper surveys the most important recent debates within the ethics of war. Sections 2 and 3 examine the principles governing the resort to war (jus ad bellum) and the principles governing conduct in war (jus in bello). In Section 4, we turn to the moral guidelines governing the ending and aftermath of war (jus post bellum). Finally, in Section 5 we look at recent debates on whether the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello can be evaluated independently (...) of each other. (shrink)